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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4786
The Clean Development Mechanism, a provision of 
The Kyoto Protocol, allows countries that have pledged 
to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to gain credit 
toward their treaty obligations by investing in projects 
located in developing (host) countries. Such projects are 
expected to benefit both parties by providing low-cost 
abatement opportunities for the investor-country, while 
facilitating capital and technology flows to the host 
country. This paper analyzes the Clean Development 
Mechanism market, emphasizing the cooperation aspects 
between host and investor countries. The analysis uses 
a dichotomous (yes/no) variable and three continuous 
variants to measure the level of cooperation, namely 
the number of joint projects, the volume of carbon 
This paper—a product of the Sustainable Rural and Urban Development Team, Development Research Group—is part 
of a larger effort in the department to mainstream research on climate change. Policy Research Working Papers are also 
posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at adinar@ucr.edu, shaikh.m.rahmnan@
ttu.edu, dlarson@worldbank.org, pambrosi@WorldBank.org.
dioxide abatement, and the volume of investment in the 
projects. The results suggest that economic development, 
institutional development, the energy structure of the 
economies, the level of country vulnerability to various 
climate change effects, and the state of international 
relations between the host and investor countries are 
good predictors of the level of cooperation in Clean 
Development Mechanism projects. The main policy 
conclusions include the importance of simplifying 
the project regulation/clearance cycle; improving the 
governance structure host and investor countries; and 
strengthening trade or other long-term economic 
activities that engage the countries. 
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The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
2 has come a long way since its launch in Marrakech 
in 2001.  As of December 31, 2007, 2,966 CDM projects have been submitted to the CDM Board 
for validation (UNFCCC, 2008).  It is expected that by 2012, the transition year when the Kyoto 
Protocol terminates and a new protocol is reckoned to be in place, the CDM Board will have 
issued Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) equivalent to 800-1,150 million tons of CO2 
(UNDP, 2006:11). Of these, 42 percent represent partnerships between developed and 
developing countries.
3  This would be an impressive achievement, and it is believed and 
expected that the interest in CDM projects by governments and private sector entrepreneurs will 
extend beyond 2012.  While the future of CDM depends on political decisions, it is also affected 
by the performance of that market, and by the fulfillment of the basic CDM objectives, namely 
greenhouse gas emission reductions that can be credited to the investor country and at the same 
time support sustainable development in the host country, as is discussed below.  Thus, CDM 
projects provide a-priori incentives for cooperation between host and investor countries. 
The potential of CDM has been studied by different disciplines, addressing different 
aspects such as efficiency, sustainability, institutions, and development.  The views regarding the 
contribution of CDM towards the development objective are mixed.  In a review of the literature 
on the (potential) impact of the CDM to sustainable development Olsen (2007:84) suggests that 
“…left to the market forces, the CDM does not significantly contribute to sustainable 
development.”  Sirohi (2007) arrives at a similar conclusion for the case of CDM project 
portfolio in India, but sees the prospect of CDM in developing the energy sector. Sirohi states 
that (p. 105) “The renewable energy projects may not be able to make any observable decline in 
the incidence of poverty … but they have immense importance in fostering development of 
energy resources in India” (that have indirect contribution to poverty reduction and growth).  A 
similar conclusion is reached by Da Cunha et al. (2007) who attempt to assess the potential 
contribution of the CDM towards the achievement of MDGs in Brazil’s remote regions. Their 
conclusion is that under certain conditions, such as improved market accessibility and synergy 
                                                 
2 According to Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, CDM is designed as a regulated market with the premise of 
cooperation among the parties to the convention and the resulting anticipated payoffs to mitigation efforts involving 
Annex I and Non-Annex I countries. 
3 The remaining projects are presented to the Board “unilaterally” by the host country and do not necessarily involve 
foreign investors. 
  2impact of other rural development policies, CDM projects could help minimize distortions in the 
access to clean energy resources in remote rural areas.  However, Sutter and Parreno (2007:75) 
conclude that “… there are currently no UNFCCC registered CDM projects that are likely to 
fulfill the … twofold objectives … of emission reduction and contributing to sustainable 
development.” 
Despite the above skepticism, the number of CDM projects submitted to the Board has 
grown at an increased rate during the 5 years since this program started (Figure 1).  Are there 
additional attributes that make the CDM attractive to both host and investor countries?  From the 
perspective of the host countries (Annex I), investment in CDM projects can be seen as a means 
of development assistance, with all derived benefits to them.  Thus, certain development 
attributes may play important roles in explaining levels of investment in CDM projects.   
Moreover, with the expectation that the demand for CERs would further increase beyond 2012, it 
would make sense to examine the factors that determine the location and extent of investment in 
CDM projects by investor countries.  However, the CDM may face a loss of interest from carbon 
investors given the lead time required in developing and implementing a project.  Without a clear 
signal from policy-makers on post-2012 prospects, the CDM may experience a significant slow 
down of activity in the near future (Cosbey et al., 2005). 
With a development objective, CDM trends can be explained, using several supply-side 
variables such as export promotion, political hegemony, donor budget allocations, and donor 
internal politics, which are mainly political economy variables (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 
2007).  But, CDM trends can also be explained using demand side considerations, where the 
developing countries formulate policies to Annex B countries’ investment in CDM projects 
(Brechet and Lussis, 2006). 
The literature summarizing the various carbon investment mechanisms and the 
development of Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ), Joint Implementation (JI), and CDM 
projects over time is quite large.  Larson and Breustedt (forthcoming) provide a detailed history 
and background work related to the pilot program of (AIJ) between 1992 and 2001.  The history, 
status, and prospects of the CDM are articulated in detail in Lecocq and Ambrosi (2007) and in 
the references they list.  And Larson et al. (1998) review carbon market policies and their recent 
development.  These sources review the extensive literature on the nature and functioning of 
  3CDM and the role regulation plays in its evolution.  The literature in these sources allow 
comprehension of the relationship between global environmental agreement on climate and its 
actual operation in the real world and its relationship to the rest of the economy in terms of 
promoting low carbon growth. 
  In this paper we focus on identifying factors that affect levels of cooperation in carbon 
abatement projects between governments of Annex B (hereafter investor) countries and 
developing (hereafter host) countries.  We focus on examining bilateral and multilateral CDM 
projects that were submitted to UNFCCC between 2003-2007 in order to provide useful 
assessment of policy interventions for possible enhancement and extension of the CDM 
mechanism beyond 2012.  We are interested in understanding the grouping of countries in the 
CDM market, or in other words, what explains cooperation and cooperation level in CDM 
between certain dyads of countries.  We model level of cooperation in CDM to explain incidence 
in projects between hosts and investor countries, and to understand why certain countries are 
heavily involved while others are not.  We use also different measures of cooperation levels, 
including the number of joint CDM projects, the amount of CO2 abatement in the CDM projects
4 
and the level of investment in CDM projects.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  The next section provides the 
conceptual framework used for determining the cooperation level in joint CDM investment 
projects among host and investor countries. Section 3 presents the data sources, the assumptions 
and procedures used in variable construction, and the empirical specifications of the estimated 
relationships.  The hypotheses regarding the relationship between the various variables in their 
different estimation contexts are spelled in Section 4.  Estimation procedures and empirical 
results are presented in Section 5.  Finally, Section 6 summarizes, highlights caveats, concludes, 
and addresses environmental and development policy implications. 
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
We look at CDM joint investment projects between two countries as a cooperative investment 
decision that is affected by both domestic factors and by economic and political interactions 
between these countries.  We borrow from the literature on foreign direct investment (FDI), as 
                                                 
4 Actually, investor country’s ultimate interest is in project CER credits, while host country interest is in the 
investment in the project in their countries and the likely multiplier effect.  Both interest lead to the CDM 
cooperation that we observe. 
  4CDM is a subset of FDI.  FDI stock or flow represent the level of cooperation among dyad states.  
We also rely on theories in the literature on international cooperation developed in the 
international relations and international economics literature, using variables that explain the 
level of other interactions between dyads of countries, and applied to the CDM market.  In the 
remainder of the section we relate variables within these categories. 
  In general, the determinants of cooperation relate to the bilateral characteristics of the 
pairing – for example trade, or unilateral characteristics of the investor and the host – for 
example characteristics of their respective energy sectors. With this is mind, cooperation 
between a given country dyad i and h can be written as: 
[1]  ) , , , ( h i h i ih ih H I H I D C C × =  
where C is level of cooperation, D represents the bilateral characteristics of a given host-investor 
pair and I and H are vectors of variables strictly attributable to investor and host country i and h, 
respectively.  We expect some interaction effects between i and h because certain variables in 
host countries are linked to considerations by investor countries. 
The CDM raised expectations as it seeks to bridge technology gap between developing 
and developed countries.  The Kyoto mechanisms are expected to serve as feedback loop for 
reducing economic and financial burden of host countries, which is expected to strongly reflect 
in the fast growing non-OECD countries.  Furthermore, CDM is expected to evolve into a form 
of FDI with opportunities for collaboration for project developers in investor countries to interact 
with host country investors (UNEP/GRID-Arendal, 2000).  
In order to analyze the level of engagement in CDM projects by investor and host 
countries, we apply the theory used for explaining FDI flows and stocks.  Dunning (2002), 
Nonnemberg (2004), Nunnenkamp (2002), and Siegel et al. (2008) provide a wide review of 
theories used to support the empirical literature, linking variables in host countries and 
considerations by investor countries.  While we include in this section a wide list of variables 
based on previous relevant work, we will restrict the set of variables we use in the empirical 
estimation of the level of cooperation to only variables that apply to both host and investor 
countries. 
  5Several factors enhance investor and host country interest in CDM projects.  According 
to Dunning (1996) the desire of firms in investor countries to seek foreign investments is 
affected by tax policy in the investor country; transaction cost in investor country and in the host 
country; and the size and status of the market for the particular product/technology transferred 
(for discussion on additional variables see Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2007).  In the case of 
the CDM market, one should also add the opportunity cost of meeting the Kyoto CO2 reduction 
quota in the investor country.  This depends on the country economy structure and growth 
trajectory, the energy dependency of the economy, the level of CO2 emission of the economy, 
and the clean energy resources it possesses (Velasco, 2007; UNEP/GRID-Arendal, 2000).   
Vulnerability to climate change and natural disasters an incentive for needed related 
actions has been well documented in the literature (e.g., Tsur and Zemel, 2008).  Agents that that 
face harsher environmental conditions would be early adopters of technologies, implement 
policies, and look for partners to sign treaties to ease their situation, in the case of states sharing a 
water body (Dinar 2009).   
But cooperation in the CDM market is not only dependent on country-specific variables.  
Joint investment in CDM projects, is a venture between international partners.  Higher levels of 
joint investment indicate a higher degree of cooperation and no investment suggests no 
cooperation.  Therefore, it is conceivable that international relations theories are likely to play 
some role alongside the profit maximization motives of the parties as in any international 
cooperation such as trade and FDI.  We follow the literature on trade and FDI in the international 
conflict and cooperation literature (e.g., Polacheck et al., 2007; Dunning 2002).  Below we 
provide the rationale behind each of the sets of the additional variables we include in the 
cooperation equation (e.g., trade and governance level). 
International Trade 
Several empirical studies argue that the extent of trade between countries provides an appropriate 
measure of their overall relations.  Trade is a measure for both openness of a country to the 
global economy and the interaction between countries.  The international relations literature’s 
assessment of the link between trade, conflict, and cooperation has been quite mixed. On the one 
hand, there has been the general claim that increased trade between countries reduces incidents 
of militarized conflict between them and promotes peace (Russett and Oneal, 2001). The fear of 
  6losing the gains from trade deters conflict. Along the same lines, it has been argued that nations 
with cooperative political relations will engage in more trade, while conflictive nations are 
expected to trade less (Pollins, 1989). On the other hand, there has been the conjecture that high 
international trade, interdependence, and conflict are positively related (Waltz, 1979).  Higher 
interdependence increases frictions among the countries, and therefore may lead to conflict.   
Barbieri (2002:121), for example, finds that the higher the interdependence and trade between 
countries the higher the likelihood of militarized conflict.  
International trade also acts as a contract enforcing mechanism.  Stein (2003), who argues 
that trade increases the likelihood of disputes between countries, also claims that it provides 
countries with an opportunity to resolve them at a lower level of international conflict.  In 
essence, the coercive potential of trade reduces conflict, the occurrence of political crisis, and the 
need for militarized actions. 
The above examination of the literature leads us to suppose that the level of relations 
among countries, measured by the extent of trade among them, is an appropriate measure for 
assessing the likelihood of cooperation negotiations (Neumayer, 2002).  In particular, these 
studies suggest that the likelihood of a CDM will be relatively higher in the case of better or 
stronger relations among countries, and will be relatively lower in the case of poorer or weaker 
relations among countries (Sigman, 2004).  
Enabling Environment: Governance, Regulations, Business Climate 
When considering international cooperation, in general, and international investment in specific 
projects, in particular, domestic institutions may play a major role in either facilitating or 
inhibiting success of the cooperation-project in question. Dinar et al. (2007) suggest that 
political, legal, and economic institutions—enabling environment—often sustain the functioning 
of the state both domestically and internationally.  It reflects not only the state’s interest in the 
project but also its ability to enter into, and honor, an investment agreement, which may require 
financial investments and costs (Congleton 1992: 412-413). The political stability and enabling 
institutions of a given state are, therefore, a principal mode to judge the viability of its domestic 
institutions, its general inclination to negotiate a project agreement and its capacity to support the 
project. 
  7Politically unstable countries have less institutional capacity to carry a project, and more 
politically stable countries may in turn have little interest in cooperative ventures with those. 
Similarly, investments are not secure and property rights poorly defined in unstable countries 
characterized by political turmoil (Deacon 1994). Participating in an agreement requires both 
competence (also in terms of appropriate investment climate and supporting regulation) and 
stability inherent in a particular polity, which will in turn be able to honor the signed project 
agreement (Young 1989:365; Young 1982:287). 
Categories of Variables to Be Used in the Analysis 
Based on the discussion in the literature, for the right hand side of the estimated relationship we 
will construct variables that represent variants of the level of economic activity; variables that 
represent the energy dependency; variables that measure the level of renewable energy 
endowments; variables that measure the cost of transactions; variables that measure vulnerability 
to climate change; variables that measure governance level; and variables that measure 
international trade among the host and investor countries.  In addition, for level of cooperation 
we will calculate measures CDM incident and variables related to the CDM activities. 
3. DATA DESCRIPTION, VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION, AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
Data used in this study are derived from several different sources.  Collected data are then 
combined and transformed for the purpose of empirical analysis. In particular, individual CDM 
project-level data are combined with corresponding host and investor country-specific 
macroeconomic and environmental variables, and alternative empirical models are specified.    
Description of Data and Variable Construction for the Empirical Analysis 
A dataset consisting of all CDM projects that have been sent to UNFCCC for validation up until 
December 31, 2007 is obtained from the CDM/JI Pipeline Analysis and Database of the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Risoe Center (2007).  From December 2003 to 
December 2007, 2,966 CDM projects were sent to UNFCCC for validation. The dataset provides 
detailed information about each individual CDM project.  That information includes project 
name, type, and current status, host country, expected emission reduction (ktCO2 per year and 
total CO2 reduction up until 2012 and 2030), credit buyers, potential energy outputs, etc.  The 
projects in the CDM pipeline are at various stages in the projects cycle.  Of the nearly 3,000 
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(6) and the rest are in various stages of evaluation.  The dataset includes 1,246 (42%) unilateral 
projects, mainly in India, China, and Brazil, and 1,592 (54%) bilateral projects.  The rest (128) 
are multilateral projects with 3-9 investor countries. Because our focus is on cooperation, 
unilateral projects are excluded from the analysis. We also drop projects that were withdrawn 
and four projects that include 5 or more country partners. For the remaining multilateral projects, 
project activities are equally divided and attributed to all plausible dyads. For example, for a 
CDM project with n investor countries, n separate dyads are formed with the same host. Amount 
of carbon abatement and capital costs are then equally divided and attributed to n investor 
countries in the dyads. However, one project is accounted for each of the n dyads because the 
single project is indivisible. We keep the projects that were subsequently rejected by the CDM 
board because they indicate propensity to cooperate, which is the subject of this paper. For a 
subset of projects (1199), we also have information about capital costs (Seres 2007).
5  
For the empirical model, we construct four measures of cooperation from this basic data 
for pairs of countries i and h.  We first use a dichotomous variable to distinguish between pairs 
that do have joint CDM projects and pairs that do not have any project at all.  The variable CDM 
Incidence (CDMI) will get a value of 0 if there is not CDM activity among the countries and a 
value of 1 if the number of CDM projects is greater than 0.  Then we measure the cooperation 
level, using three variables, namely, Number of Projects (NPRJ), Total CO2 Abatement (Total 
CO2 Abatement) in million tones of Certified Emissions Reduction (CER) of CO2 equivalent and 
Volume of Investment (VINV) in million constant US dollars.  When direct information on 
project costs is missing (we have only 1199 projects with direct investment cost data), we 
categorized projects by type (9 types) and size (2 sizes: small and big) and calculated for each 
and average investment cost value.  We then used average investment cost to extrapolate to 
projects for which we did not have investment cost data. 
As discussed in the context of equation 1, we use both pair-wise and country 
characteristics as determinants in our statistical models. For the bilateral measure, we use the 
level of bilateral trade among the countries (TRD). We also include five additional country 
characteristics for both host and investor: i) the economic development of the countries 
                                                 
5 See Appendix 1 for details. 
  9(measured in either GDP, or ENR), ii) the energy sources status (REN), iii) climate 
vulnerabilities of the countries (IVUL), iv) governance level of the countries (GOVR), and v) 
Ease of Doing Business in the countries (EDB).   
While we use only six groups of right hand side variables, we still need to calculate some 
of them, and the dependent variable, using additional variables.  Therefore, we report here all 
data we have used and which variables have used which variables in their construction.  Annual 
GDP (both in current and 2000 constant US$ absolute and per capita terms), energy and 
electricity production, import, and consumption (both in absolute and per capita terms), and the 
volume of CO2 emissions (in terms of total kiloton of oil equivalent, per capita CO2, and CO2 per 
dollar of 2000 PPP GDP) data for all countries of the world during 1960-2003 are obtained from 
the World Development Indicators (WDI, World Bank, 2007).
6  In addition, country level 
estimates of total energy available from nonrenewable sources (e.g., coal, oil, gas, oil shale, and 
bitumen) and annual energy available from renewable (e.g., solar, onshore and offshore wind, 
hydro, geothermal, and biofuels) sources are obtained from Buys et al (2007).   
These data are used to construct variables reflecting economic development, available 
energy resources, and emission intensity of the host and investor countries.  Economic 
development variables include Total GDP (GDP_TOT), Average GDP (GDP_AVG), and GDP 
per Capita (GDP_PC).  Energy resources of each country are constructed by adding up potential 
non-renewable and renewable energy resources and are represented by two variables: 
Nonrenewable Energy ( NREN) and Renewable Energy ( REN).  In addition, two separate 
variables are constructed to reflect intensity of energy use in each country: Avr Annual Energy 
Use (ENR_AVG) and Annual per Capita Energy Use (ENR_PC).  See Appendix 3 for further 
detailed description of the variables considered for this study and their specification. 
  Buys et al (2007) provide measures for countries’ vulnerability to climate change and 
emissions reduction mandates.  They first construct individual indices for alternative sources of 
vulnerability and then calculate composite index values by categorizing the sources of 
vulnerability into two major groups: impact and source vulnerabilities.  We use the first one in 
our empirical analysis.  Impact vulnerability refers to the country’s ability to sustain climate 
change impacts such as weather damage and sea level rise.  The quantitative score (scale of 1 to 
                                                 
6 Data on CO2 per dollar of 2000 PPP GDP were not available prior to 1975.  
  10100) of the Impact Vulnerability (IVUL) for the host and investor countries of the CDM projects 
are obtained from Buys et al (2007) and used in our empirical analysis.   
Estimates of six dimensions of governance of the host and investor countries are obtained 
from Kaufmann et al (2007).  The six dimensions of governance are: Voice and Accountability, 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, 
Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption.  Kaufmann et al estimate these dimensions of 
governance of 212 countries during the period of 1996-2006 based on several hundred individual 
variables measuring the perceptions of governance reflecting the views of public sector, private 
sector and NGO experts, as well as thousands of citizen and firm survey respondents worldwide. 
Kaufmann et al (2007) aggregate these individual measures into the above six categories, using a 
statistical methodology known as unobserved components model. In particular, they first rescale 
the individual indicators from each underlying source in order to make them comparable across 
data sources. Then they construct a weighted average of each of these rescaled data sources to 
construct the aggregate indicators of governance.  The weights they assign to each data sources 
are based on the estimates of the precision of each source that are produced by the unobserved 
components model.  Combining the six governance measures of Kaufmann et al. (2007), a 
Governance variable (GOVR) is constructed, using a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) that 
reflects overall governance level of the host and investor countries of each of the CDM projects.  
We used the ease of doing business (EDB) indicators as a proxy for the transaction costs 
associated with the CDM projects implementation.  EDB indicators, comparing business 
regulations and protection of property rights across 178 countries and over time are obtained 
from World Bank (2008). The EDB index ranks economies from 1 to 178 by measuring 
regulations affecting 10 stages of a business’s life: starting a business, dealing with licenses, 
employing workers, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, 
trading across borders, enforcing contracts, and closing a business. The index reflects the ranking 
of simple average of country percentile rankings on each of the 10 topics, with a higher rank 
indicating less favorable business atmosphere. The ranking on each of the 10 topics is the simple 
average of the percentile ranking on its component indicators.
7 The rankings remain almost the 
                                                 
7 The choice of aggregation method has little influence on the ranking. More complex aggregation methods such as 
principal components and unobserved components yield nearly identical rankings (Djankov and others, 2005). 
  11same over the years, from 2003 to 2007. However, a simple average of the rankings over the 
years is used to calculate the overall Ease of Doing Business (EDB) in each country. 
Data on annual bilateral trade between all countries in the world are obtained from 
International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2007), for the period of 1960-2003. Using the sum of the 
volumes of bilateral trade and GDP (in current US$) of the host and investor countries, two 
alternative trade variables, Trade1 and Trade2 (TRD1 and TRD2) are constructed following Dinar 
et al (2007).
8 The first trade variable (TRD1) expresses total trade (the sum of the volume of 
bilateral imports and exports) between the host and investor countries as a fraction of the sum of 
the countries’ GDPs. The second trade variable (TRD2) measures the total trade (the sum of the 
volume of bilateral imports and exports) between the host and investor countries as a fraction of 
their trade with the rest of the world.
9  TRD1 is referred to as trade importance and TRD2 is 
referred to as trade dependency.  For a group of N≥2 countries the TRD1 and TRD2 (Trade1 and 
Trade2) are: 
[2]  =
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Where IMP and EXP are import and export, respectively, t is year, w is the rest of the world, not 
including any country j and k in N.   
                                                 
8 The definitions of these variables are available in Dinar et al (2007). Since the IMF trade data are in current $US; 
country-level GDP in current $US (collected from the WDI of the World Bank) are used to construct the trade 
variables.   
9 For multiple investor countries, TRD1 expresses trade as the sum of total volume of exports and imports between 
the host country and each investor country as a fraction of the sum of GDP of each of the country involved in the 
CDM project. On the other hand, TRD2 measures the total trade (the sum of the volume of bilateral imports and 
exports) between the host and each investor country as a fraction of their trade with the rest of the world.  
  124. HYPOTHESES 
We selected a particular set of variables for inclusion in the regression analysis.  These variables 
were selected because, at least theoretically, each can be attributed to explaining both investor 
and host countries’ desire to cooperate.  From the above discussion and based on previous work 
on FDI and AIJ determinants that resemble behavioral patterns similar to those of CDM (e.g., 
Agarwal, 1980; Dunning 2002; Nonnemberg et al., 2005; Nonnenkamp 2002; and Larson and 
Breustedi, 2007), it is reasonable to hypothesize that, while all other variables are held constant, 
CDM incident and the level of cooperation between host and investor countries will increase 
(decrease) with higher (lower) level of economic development; will increase (decrease) with 
higher (lower) levels of energy use, and thus emission intensities, of its economy.  We 
hypothesize that for an investor country the level of cooperation will decrease (increase) and for 
host country it will increase (decrease) with more renewable energy resources available in that 
country; And the more (less) vulnerable to climate change the economies are, the higher (lower) 
will the cooperation be. 
Additional variables included in the empirical models are trade, business environment, 
and governance.  Based on our conceptual framework we expect that CDM incidence and the 
level of cooperation between host and investor countries will increase (decrease) as trade widens 
(shrinks); will decrease (increase) as transaction cost of doing business are higher (lower); will 
increase (decrease) as governance level in the country increases (decreases); will increase 
(decrease) as vulnerability level in the country increases (decreases); will increase (decrease) as 
development level in the country increases (decreases); and will decrease (increase) as renewable 
energy resource levels in the country are higher (lower). 
To be specific, we expect  0 > ∂ ∂ TRD Ci ,  0 > ∂ ∂ GOVR Ci ,  0 > ∂ ∂ IVUL Ci , 
0 > ∂ ∂ GDP Ci ,  0 < ∂ ∂ EDB Ci ,  0 < ∂ ∂ REN Ci , where Ci is the cooperation variant (i=CDMI, 
NPRJ, VINV, TCO2).   
This paper focuses on a relatively narrow set of hypotheses, mainly related to the 
cooperation aspect of CDM.  Additional hypotheses could be about the growth pattern of CDM 
and whether or not it is affected by the regulation of the carbon product.  For example, does 
growth of CDM follow the same trend as the international trade/FDI between countries or does it 
follow a curtailed growth path considering the strong role of regulation in approving the carbon 
  13assets for trade in CDM.  This and similar hypotheses are very relevant and will be addressed in 
a different paper. 
5. ESTIMATION PROCEDURES AND RESULTS
10 
Depending on the characteristics of the dependent variables, appropriate econometric procedures 
are applied to estimate the incidence and level of CDM cooperation according to the models 
specified above. The incidence of host and investor countries in CDM activity is represented by a 
dichotomous variable indicating whether a particular dyad has any CDM activity (the dependent 
variable is set equal to 1 for those dyads having CDM activity and equal to 0 for those without 
any CDM activity). The probability that host and investor countries will jointly engage in CDM 
activity is estimated by regressing the characteristics of the host and investor countries and dyads 
on the dichotomous variable. Both logit and probit models are employed to estimate the 
probability.  
As described earlier, the level of CDM cooperation between host and investor countries is 
represented by three alternative measures: the number of CDM projects, amount of CO2 
abatement, and volume of capital investments. When the level of cooperation (the dependent 
variable) is measured by the number of CDM projects (i.e., NPRJ), Poisson regression models 
are estimated. In this case, the ith observation on NPRJ is assumed to be a conditional draw from 
a Poisson distribution, the natural logarithm of the mean of which is a linear function of 
explanatory variables.  Maximum likelihood estimates are calculated using the density function 
of the Poisson distribution with equal mean and variance.  
Dependent variables representing total carbon abatement (TCO2) and volume of 
investment (VINV) have observations at 0, corresponding to dyads that do not cooperate in CDM 
activity. The OLS estimates based on such a censored sample are likely to be biased.  Since 
values of explanatory variables are also available for the countries not participating in the CDM 
activity, a tobit model is appropriate that determine both the probability of participating in the 
CDM activity and the levels of TCO2 and VINV when these are positive.  (See Appendix 2 for 
definitions of variables used in the regression analyses.)  Several specifications of the Poisson 
and tobit models are examined.  
                                                 
10 See Appendix 2 for variable definition. 
  14Descriptive Statistics Results 
We start by providing a descriptive statistics of project-level variables.  Note that we created 
more variables than we use in the regression analysis because of the interest these variables 
create.  Those variables are not given acronyms.  We then move to describe country-level and 
project-related variables, both for host and investor countries. Finally we provide descriptive 
statistics of main variables for the dyad-level variables.
11 
Project Level 
Table 2 includes the descriptive statistics for variables in the project-level dataset.  In this table 
we include all reported projects, including unilateral ones.  Some additional descriptive results 
may be of interest.  There are 2966 projects that have been submitted to the UNFCCC.  Of these, 
1966 are at validation, 806 are already registered, 42 were rejected (36) or withdrawn (6) and the 
rest are in various stages of evaluation.  The dataset includes 1246 (42%) unilateral projects, 
mainly in India, China, and Brazil, and 1592 (54%) bilateral projects.  The rest (128) are 
multilateral projects with 3-9 participating countries.  We dropped the projects that were 
withdrawn and the projects that include 5 or more country partners (4). We kept the projects that 
were rejected because they indicate propensity to cooperate, which is the subject of this paper. 
Therefore our dataset includes 2956 project observations. Eighty two percent of the projects are 
associated with power generation; 37 percent create hydro, solar and wind energy; and 29 
percent create energy from agricultural biomass.  Project life ranges between 7 and 30 years.  
Mean investment per 1,000 tons of CO2 abatement is $38,004. Mean electricity generation 
capacity per project is 31.2 Mwh. And mean per annum abatement of CO2 is 140.6 kiloton of oil 
equivalent.   
Country Level 
In the dataset there are 170 host countries (including island countries) and 36 investor countries, 
many of which are involved in CDM investment.  We present the data separately for the host and 
for the investor countries, in Tables 3 and 4, respectively.   
                                                 
11 It is important to note that project-level and country-level descriptive statistics results are reported for all available 
observation in each category while dyad-level descriptive statistics are reported only for the observations included in 
the regression analysis. 
  15The mean number of projects per host and investor country is 17 and 54, respectively, but 
it varies between 0 and 960 for host countries and 0 and 720 for investor countries, (Note that 
India and China host many projects that are funded by local investors.) Mean values of 
governance in host countries are quite low with a mean of -2.49.  Source vulnerability for host 
and investor countries are quite similar (56.25 and 55.93 respectively), but host countries are 
much more vulnerable than investor countries 49.95 and 27.50, respectively).  Some of the 
variables deserve a mention.  First, mean sample values suggest that CO2 per capita abatement 
levels of host countries are about 50 percent of investor country levels.  A similar value was 
found for GDP per capita and energy per capita.  Finally, mean per capita values for 
nonrenewable energy resources are about 400 times higher for host countries, while they are only 
14 times richer in renewable energy resources per capita than investor countries. 
Dyad Level 
With 34 investor countries (excluding Australia and the USA) and 175 host countries, there are 
5,950 plausible host-investor pairs.
12  Only 195 of the host-investor pairs have CDM project 
activity, while 46 host countries have unilateral projects.  Unilateral CDM projects were 
removed from the dyad-level analysis.  Dyads without any CDM projects can be regarded as the 
non-cooperation dyads.  Because we use 3 different left-hand side variables the missing values 
problem results in different sample size for each dependent variable and making it harder to 
compare the results.  Therefore, we use only 2,771 dyad-level observations that allow 
comparisons among the various dependent variables. 
The descriptive statistics of dyad-based variables used in our analysis are presented in 
Table 5.  Annual CO2 abatement level values are nearly 113 kilotons, ranging between 0 and 
nearly 89,793 kilotons.  Annual Volume of Investment cost (VINV_YR) values are $19.6 million, 
and mean trade ratio values are 0.00037 and 0.00090 for TRD1 and TRD2 respectively.  The 
independent variables are presented for host and investor country, separately.  The interaction 
variables (host × investor) are not presented.  Several results are worth mentioning.  First, we 
note main differences in the various variables between host and investor countries in the dyads.  
                                                 
12 Australia and the USA are excluded from the dataset because Australia did not ratify Kyoto until 2005 and the 
USA is yet to ratify Kyoto. Few host countries are also omitted from the dataset because they are very small and 
country-level data are not available for those.  (Our descriptive statistics in Table 3 includes Australia which brings 
the number of Dyads to 6125.) 
  16Investor countries have higher Average GDP, higher Average Annual Energy Use, better ranking 
of Ease of Doing Business, better Governance, and lower Impact Vulnerability.  However, host 
countries have significantly much higher endowments of Renewable Energy than do investor 
countries.  As was hypothesized, earlier, we expect that this difference is attractive to investor 
countries.   
Results for the Cooperation Estimates 
To reduce complications associated with having the dyad as the observation unit, our variables 
capture the bilateral nature of the dyad.  All variables incorporate values for the two countries in 
the dyad that are engaged in the CDM activity.  In the case of all other variables except Trade, 
we use values for host, for investor, and the interaction between investor and the host country.  In 
the case of Trade, we have two variants and both incorporate the values of the host and investor 
countries into the variable. 
  We present results for a set of 2,771 country dyads that have all the needed data in all the 
regression specifications.  We also report, in Appendix 3, the results of regressions that have a 
larger number of observations due to availability of data.  All our equation estimates (Tables 6-9) 
have significant fit with Likelihood Ratio values that are significant at the 1 percent level in all 
estimates. 
  Results are presented in Table 6 for the dichotomous CDM Incidence (CDMI).  For both 
the logit (column 1) and probit (column 2) estimation procedures results are as expected.  Higher 
economic development levels measured as Average annual energy use (ENR_AVG) of both host 
and investor countries are significant and positive; Governance level (GOVR) and impact 
vulnerability (IVUL) are both significant and positive.  The trade variable (TRD1) is positive and 
significant.  The Ease of doing business (EDB) behaves also as expected with a negative and 
significant sign assigned to the host country and an insignificant coefficient assigned to the 
investor country.  The Renewable Energy (REN) endowment of the host country has a positive 
and significant coefficient and that of the investor country has a negative and significant one.  In 
column 3 of Table 6 we present also the marginal effect calculated at the sample mean as the 
change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent.  The marginal effect of 
bilateral trade has by far the highest impact, where a 1 percent change in dyad trade increases the 
  17likelihood of CDM incidence by close to 5%.  All other independent variables are much less 
effective but among them governance has the highest effect. 
Results are presented in tables 7, 8, and 9 for the 3 variants of level of cooperation, 
namely number of projects (NPRJ), CO2 abatement (TCO2) and volume of investment (VINV), 
respectively.  Most interaction terms are statistically insignificant.  In all functional forms, all 
country economic development variables (GDP_AVG;  ENER_AVG) are positive and have a 
significant sign, meaning that more cooperation is expected as both the investor and the host 
countries are more developed.  Renewable energy profile of the RENRG variable is significant in 
all regressions.  It is positive in the case of a host country (hst_RENERG), while it is negative in 
the case of the investor country (inv_RENRG).  This suggests that renewable energy resources 
operate in opposite directions in host and investor countries, which is consistent with the relevant 
hypothesis.  For a host country, abundant renewable resources imply more CDM project to offer.  
For an investor country, abundant renewable resources imply opportunities to invest in carbon 
abatement projects at home and less incentive for investments abroad.   
Ease of Doing Business (EDB) has the expected negative and significant coefficients in 
estimates for both host and investor countries in Table 6 where the dependent variable is the 
number of projects (NPRJ).  It has expected negative and significant coefficients for the host 
country (hst_EDB) in the cases of the other two dependent variables, TCO2 and VINV (Table 7 
and 8).  However, it has a non-significant coefficient for the investor country in these two tables.  
Our interpretation is that EDB is a very important consideration in host countries for CDM 
investment.  It is less important in the case of investor countries.  It is important to indicate that 
higher levels of that variable mean more difficulty of doing business in that country.   
Governance (GOVR) is also an important variable in our analysis.  It has positive and 
significant coefficients for inv_Governance variable in all equations, and positive, but not 
significant coefficients for the hst_Governance variable in several equations.  Better governance 
leads to higher cooperation.  The coefficient of the impact vulnerability variable (IVUL) was 
positive and significant, as expected, in all estimated regressions for both host and investor 
countries.  This means that the higher the vulnerability level of the country, either a host or an 
investor, the more it will be willing to cooperate in CDM investment for different reasons.  For a 
host country such cooperation means improvement of its development opportunity, and for an 
  18investor country this means a lower cost of meeting its CO2 reduction obligations, and a long-
term contribution towards reduction of GHGs.   
6. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In this paper we analyzed the CDM market from the point of view of cooperation between 
developing (host) and developed (investor) countries.  We used a dichotomous variable to 
measure incidence of country involvement in CDM projects and three variants to measure 
cooperation level, namely number of joint CDM projects, volume of CO2 abatement that can be 
realized from the CDM projects, and volume of investment in the CDM projects.  All 
cooperation equation estimates provided robust and consistent results, for all four cooperation 
variants.  We used linear functional forms in the independent variables.  We used linear and log 
transformation for the investment variable.  Our results suggest that the variables we used – 
namely economic development, institutional development, energy structure of the economies, 
level of country vulnerability to various climate change effects, and international relationship 
between the host and investor countries – are good predictors of the level of cooperation in CDM 
projects we may expect.  Coefficients of the interaction terms of these variables between the host 
and investor countries, in most cases, have not been significant.   
  In deriving conclusions from the analysis, we will start by comparing our results to those 
of other studies that attempt to explain the level of cooperation between countries.  We used 
trade to explain the level of cooperation in CDM projects.  The two trade variables we 
constructed suggest that countries with strong trade relations, that imply also other types of 
international relations ties, will be more likely to cooperate over CDM projects.  Trade was 
found in many other studies to be a key in explaining cooperation in water treaties and in FDI.  
Trade is only an example of economic ties among the dyad countries.  Therefore, the overall 
conclusion is that any type of active relationships among the dyad countries would lead to higher 
likelihood of cooperation over CDM. 
  Another variable that has similar impact in other studies of international cooperation is 
the level of governance in the country.  It is frequently suggested that governance matters and 
that institutional strength is a prerequisite for better performance, both domestic and 
international.  Other studies that were reviewed earlier suggest as well that higher level of 
governance makes countries better parties for cooperation over many issues.  A similar 
  19interpretation can be attributed to the variable measuring ease of doing business.  Our results 
suggest, as it is expected, that the situation in the investor country does not matter.  What matters 
is the level of ease of doing business in the host country.  The more difficult it is to do business 
in a host country, the less it will attract domestic and international investors.  It is quite 
straightforward, but needed empirical proof.  Studies on FDI demand and supply identified ease 
of doing business in the investor (source) country to be negatively correlated with FDI supply.  
This was explained by having local entrepreneurs in developing countries look for other markets 
because they can minimize their transaction cost of doing business at home.  Our results suggest 
the same impact only in the case of using the number of projects as an indicator for the level of 
cooperation.  In other cases this variable’s coefficient was not significant.   
  All other variables measure the natural endowment of a country and thus may be less 
affected by policy interventions.  Our policy discussion would therefore be focused only on the 
suggestion that international development institutions focus mainly on the strengthening of 
multilateral interactions between countries and on domestic structural changes and reforms to 
economies, so that they are better prepared not only to adapt to climate change but also to be able 
to better cooperate in the CDM market and take advantage of the CDM dividend—
development—that results from CDM joint investment. 
There are several variables in the cooperation equation specification that are state 
variables in the sense their level cannot be controlled, at least directly, by policy makers.  This 
leaves the range of policy interventions narrower.  Still, Governance and EDB leave sufficient 
degrees of freedom to policy makers.  One issue that has been raised in Carbon Finance 
discussions is the complications of the CDM project clearance process, which becomes a barrier 
to CDM project development.  Simplifying the CDM project clearance cycle is an important 
policy option.  EDB goes hand in hand with Governance although they are not necessarily 
correlated.  Improved governance in the host and in the investor countries means higher political 
stability and trust between the countries for business.  Finally, trade or other long-term economic 
activities that connect the countries is an important inhibitor for CDM cooperation.  Having a 
regional or international trade agreement or the like will increase the likelihood of CDM 
incidence and higher level of cooperation on CDM projects.   
  20Thus, all three variables, EDB,  Trade, and Governance have a significant impact, 
increasing future viability of the CDM market.  These variables represent both state-level and 
international-level policy interventions, which governments and international development 
institutions have already identified as important directions for their future commitment.  The 
analysis in this paper further highlights and quantifies these declared commitments.  
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  25Table 1: Correlation Matrix for Dependent Variables Used in the Cooperation Equations 
  NPRJ  TCO2  VINV  TCO2YR 
Number  of  Projects  1     
Total CO2 Abatement   0.812  1     
Volume of Investment   0.913  0.946  1   
Total CO2 Abatement per year   0.757  0.995  0.919  1 




Table 2: Project-level descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Annual CO2 abatement (ktCO2e)  2956 140.64 487.32  4  10437 
Total CO2 abatement during 
project life (ktCO2e) 
2956 1120.42 3583.17  3.5  73059 
CDM-based electricity generation  
capacity (MW) 
2474 31.20  100.09  0  1560 
Investment cost
a  (US$)  1199 3.31E07 6.22E07  7222 7.87E08 
Notes: 
aAll monetary values in this paper are 2000 constant US$. 
  26Table 3: Country-level descriptive statistics (Host countries) 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Number of projects  175 16.89 99.53 0  960
Annual CO2 abatement (ktCO2e)
 a  175 2375.75 18177.86 0 233211
Total CO2 abatement during project life  175 18925.58 137625.67 0  1735068
Annual investment cost (Mill. US$)  175 20.6 133 0  1570
Total investment cost (Mill. US$)  175 182 1230 0  14900
Annual GDP (Mill. US$ Const. 2000)  153 42100 122000 4390 17900000
GDP per capita (Constant 2000 US$)  152 3383 5139 101  23903
Climate change impact vulnerability  170 49.95 21.45 1  91.28
Governance 116 -2.40 4.96 -14.12  11.34
Ease of Doing Business  142 103.15 45.98 1 178
Renewable energy per capita (ton oil 
eqv.) 
168 15.29 116.89 0 1506.21
Note: 
a ktCO2e = Kiloton of oil equivalent. 
  27Table 4: Country-level data descriptive statistics (Investor countries) 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Number of projects  34 54.11 132.52  0  720
Annual CO2 Abatement (ktCO2e)  34 9299.81 23109.15 0  124150.1
Annual investment cost (Mill US$)  34 212 508  0  2670
Renewable energy per capita (ton oil eqv.)  34 6.64 18.57  0.22  106.03
Climate change impact vulnerability  34 27.50 12.72  1  50.38
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics results for dyad-level variables in the analysis 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
CDMI  2771 0.065 0.247 0 1
Number of Projects  2771 0.657 8.04 0 321
Total CO2 Abatement  2771 866.50 14820.18 0 672990.5
Annual CO2 Abatement  2771 112.80 1977.78 0 89793.5
Total Volume of Investment  2771 1.96E+07 3.35E+08 0 1.53E+10
Annual Volume of Investment  2771 2574199 4.45E+07 0 2.03E+09
Trade1 2771 0.00037 0.00101 0  0.02397
Trade2 2771 0.00090 0.00294 0  0.05724
hst_Averag GDP  2771 42233.17 79493.96   864.5967   407822.8
inv_Averag GDP  2771 289208.43 559055 5154.85 2914536
hst_Average Annual Energy Use  2771 33.03 95.20 0.885 790.7972
inv_Average Annual Energy Use  2771 82.97 129.83 1.69 640.80
hst_Ease of Doing Business  2771 98.90 42.00 1 178
inv_Ease of Doing Business  2771 37.46 33.26 2 139
hst_Governance  2771 -2.39 4.45 -12.45 11.34
inv_Governance  2771 7.91 4.74 -4.11 13.48
hst_Renewable Energy  2771 5516.84 12786.63 0 62220
inv_Renewable Energy  2771 113.96 353.60 1 1937
hst_Impact Vulnerability  2771 46.44 16.88 1 80.72
inv_Impact Vulnerability  2771 27.51 12.53 1 50.38
Note: See Appendix 2 for units of measurement. Interaction terms are not shown. 
  29Table 6: Regression results for CDM Engagement (No interaction trms) 
Equation 1  2  3 
Estimation procedure  Logit  Probit 
Dependet variable  CDM 
Engagement 
CDM Engagement 
     Marginal  Effect
a 
































































Overall observed probability  0.065
Predicted Probability  0.016
In parentheses are t-values; *** (=0.01); ** (=0.05); * (=0.10). 
aMarginal effect: the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent. 





Estimation  procedure  Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson 


















hst_inv_Averag GDP     -1.07E-12*** 
(-6.16) 
 








host_inv_Average Annual Energy Use      -1.70E-06*** 
(-2.58) 
































































































Observations  2771 2771 2771 2771 
Log  Likelihood  -2760.34 -2630.94 -2715.74 -2596.95 
LR  10076.69*** 10335.49***  10165*** 10403.48*** 
Pseudo R
2  0.646 0.662 0.651 0.667 
In parentheses are t-values; *** (=0.01); ** (=0.05); * (=0.10). 
Note: 
aSee Appendix 3, equation 1 for regression results of 3411 observations; 
bSee Appendix 3, 
equation 2 for regression results of 3411 observations. 
  31Table 8: Regression results for CDM projects cooperation level (Dependent variable is project 
CO2 abatement level) 
Equation 1  2  3  4  5  6 
Estimation procedure  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit 
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Observations 2771  2771  2771  2771  2771  2771 
Uncensored obs.  182  182  182  182  182  182 
Log Likelihood  -2477.73  -2477.86  -1113.53 -1083.83  -2467.98  -1112.32 
LR 431.28***  431.04***  422.78***  426.03***  450.79***  425.21*** 
Pseudo R
2 0.080  0.080  0.159  0.164  0.083  0.160 
In parentheses are t-values; *** (=0.01); ** (=0.05); * (=0.10). 
 




b 3  4  5 
Estimation  procedure  Tobit Tobit Tobit  Tobit  Tobit 













hst_Averag GDP        6.30E-05** 
(2.56) 
inv_Averag GDP        2.09E-05*** 
(8.25) 
hst_inv_Averag GDP        1.99E-11 
(1.07) 






































hst_inv_Ease of Doing Business        1.81E-03 
(0.87) 




















host_inv_Governance        -0.034 
(-0.21) 




















host_inv_Renewable Energy        1.05E-05 
(0.76) 




















host_inv_Impact Vulnerability        -4.77E-03 
(-0.58) 




Trade2       657.55** 
(1.98) 
 










Observations  2771  2771 2771 2771  2771 
Uncensored  obs.  182  182 182 182  182 
Log Likelihood  -4306.05  -3938.14 -1207.96 -1191.85  -1207.47 
LR  423.80  424.20 420.42*** 420.13***  421.38*** 
Pseudo R
2  0.047  0.051 0.148 0.149  0.148 
In parentheses are t-values; *** (=0.01); ** (=0.05); * (=0.10). 
Note: See Appendix 3, equation 3 for regression results of 2856 observations; See Appendix 3, equation 4 for 
regression results of 2856 observations. 
 
















































Figure 1: Accumulative number of CDM submitted projects 2003-2007. 
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APPENDIX 1: METHODOLOGY FOR THE DATA COLLECTION ON THE CAPITAL COST DATA FROM 
CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM PROJECT ACTIVITY
13 
Reporting project capital cost data is not required in for CDM registration, but the information is 
sometimes used to demonstrate additionality.  One consequence is that the way the information 
is presented in official CDM documents is not standardized and some interpretation is required.   
Of those PDDs that contain capital cost information, it is often reported as “Capital costs” 
or “fixed costs” for the project, and as a single number either in host country currency units or 
USD.  From what is reported, capital cost in the CDM PDDs generally includes: (1) procurement 
of any plant and/or machinery dedicated to the realization of the CDM project, (2) construction 
and civil works, and (3) engineering consultation (non-ongoing).  In some cases, the following 
were included in the capital costs: (1) Costs incurred for the validation, registration, and 
verification of the project as a CDM project, (2) Contingency and margin money for working 
capital, (3) interest during construction, and (4) licenses. 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to disaggregate the costs as only one (all inclusive) number 
was reported.  In some cases, project participants reported all costs, including variable costs in a 
table.  For these cases, capital cost had to be reconstituted into a single number in order to record 
it into the dataset.
14   
Methods in obtaining capital cost data 
As stated above, information on project costs is sometimes used in the demonstration of 
“additionality” of the CDM project.  The section of the PDD where participants prove the 
additionality of the project is section B.5. 
In each of the PDDs, this section was thoroughly reviewed to determine if capital cost 
data was included.  In addition, the entire PDD was searched using key words such as USD, $, 
investment, cost, capital, and currency acronym for the host country (ex: for projects in china, 
key words included, CNY, RMB, yuan).   
                                                 
13 We thank Stephen Seres for helping with this Annex. 
14 Most PDDs provided one single capital cost value which generally included construction, equipment, and 
engineering costs.  Where detailed tables were included, only the values for construction, equipment, and 
engineering costs were summed to produce a single value for the dataset with hopes at maintaining comparability.   
  35All cost data was recorded in the spreadsheet in the currency units used in the PDD.  All 
cost data were converted into USD using the spot exchange rate on the 20
th of November 2007.  
The exchange rates used were included in the dataset.    
Perspective in capital cost data 
It may be important to note two facts with regard to the capital cost data from CDM project 
activity.   
First, it should not be assumed that the CDM projects have been implemented yet and so 
capital cost outlays may not have occurred.  The CDM project data represents all projects that 
have been put forth for validation and registration.  This may, and often does, occur prior to 
commitments on capital purchases have been made.  However, it is largely expected that these 
projects will be implemented.  
Second, it should not be assumed that the reported capital expenditures on CDM projects 
are solely attributable to the CDM.  In many cases, capital expenditures would have taken place 
in its absence.  For instance, wind farm and hydro projects are implemented to increase the host 
country’s power generation capacity.  In the absence of the CDM, it is likely that capital 
expenditures would have taken place regardless, in order to increase the host country’s power 
generation capacity, albeit with a different technology and less of a capital outlay.  However, for 
certain project types, where there is no revenue stream other than CDM credits, i.e. landfill gas 
and animal waste flaring projects, it would be fair to assume that the capital cost expenditures are 
solely attributable to the CDM. 
  36APPENDIX 2: DEFINITION OF VARIABLES USED IN THE REGRESSION ANALYSES 
      
Variable  Description  Unit of Measurement 
Ease of Doing 
Business 
EDB  Ease of doing business, a relative ranking 
of the countries reflecting the state of 
business regulation 
Smaller value indicates less 
favorable business environment 
CDM Incidence  CDMI  A dichotomous variable with 0 if there 
are no, and 1 if there are any number of 
CDM dyad projects. 
0 or 1 
Avr Annual Energy 
Use 
ENR_AVG  Average annual energy use over t he 
period 1960-2003 
Million tons of oil equivalent 
Annual Per Capita 
Energy Use 
ENR_PC  Annual per capita energy consumption   Tons of oil equivalent  
GDP GDP_TOT  Total gross domestic product for the 
period 1960-2003. 
Million US $ (constant 2000) 
GDP per Capita  GDP_PC  Gross domestic product per capita for the 
period 1960-2003. 
Thousand US $ (constant 2000) 
Average GDP  GDP_AVG  Average annual gross domestic product 
for the period 1960-2003 
Million US $ (constant 2000) 
Governance GOVR  Indicator reflecting the overall 
governance level, a principal component 
product of 6 governance indicators 
Smaller value indicates poorer 
level of governance 
Impact 
Vulnerability 
IVUL  Impact vulnerability index (reflecting 
country vulnerability in terms of various 
impacts of climate change) 
Scale of 1 to 100 (1= lowest, 
100=highest) 
Number of Project  NPRJ  Number of CDM projects   
Nonrenewable 
Energy 
NREN  Non-renewable energy resources (total) 
available per capita 
Million tons of oil equivalent  
Renewable Energy  REN  Renewable energy resources (annual) 
available per capita. 
Million tons of oil equivalent  
Total CO2 
Abatement 
TCO2_TOT  Total amount of CO2 abatement (CERs) 
until 2012. 
Kiloton of oil equivalent 
Annual CO2 
Abatement 
TCO2_YR  Annual amount of CO2 abatement 
(CERs) until 2012. 
Kiloton of oil equivalent 
Trade1 TRD1  Total trade (the sum of the volume of 
bilateral imports and exports) between 
the host and investor countries as a 
fraction of the sum of the countries’ 
GDPs 
Share 
Trade2 TRD2  Total trade (the sum of the volume of 
bilateral imports and exports) between 
the host and investor countries as a 





VINV  Volume of investment in CDM projects: 
_TOT  reflecting total investment and 
_YR reflecting annual investment 
US $ (constant 2000) 
hst_* hst_*  Variable related to the host country  * represents the variables 
described above 
inv_* inv_*  Variable related to the investor country  * represents the variables 
described above 
hst_inv_* hst_inv_*  An interaction term  * represents the variables 
described above 
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APPENDIX 3: REGRESSION RESULTS WITH AN EXTENDED NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS. 
Equation  1 2 3 4 
Estimation procedure  Poisson  Poisson  Tobit  Tobit 



















hst_inv_Averag GDP   -1.18E-12*** 
(-6.93) 
  
























hst_inv_Ease of Doing Business   -4.19E-5 
(-0.61) 
  
















host_inv_Governance   1.64E-04 
(0.04) 
  
















host_inv_Renewable Energy   -1.23E-06*** 
(-4.63) 
  
















host_inv_Impact Vulnerability   -1.15E-03*** 
(-5.24) 
  













Observations  3411 3411 2856 2856 
Uncensored  obs.     182 182 
Log  Likelihood  -2898.2 -2849.64 -4313.30 -3945.42 
LR  10573.85***  10670.97*** 419.20*** 419.69*** 
Pseudo R
2  0.646 0.651 0.046 0.050 
In parentheses are t-values; *** (=0.01); ** (=0.05); * (=0.10). 
 